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Abstract
Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general 
exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out 
of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the 
products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer 
to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim of science is partially determined 
by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background 
knowledge, stands behind a methodology that is responsible for empirically and aim-ad-
equate theoretical results.
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1. Values, interests and social constructions
Scientific	practice	is	a	social	practice,	and	every	enterprise	of	knowledge	in	
general	 exhibits	 important	 social	 dimensions.	 But	 should	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
scientific	practice	 is	born	out	of	and	 tied	 to	 the	collaborative	efforts	of	 the	
members	of	a	social	group	be	taken	to	affect	the	products	of	these	practices	
as	well?	Should	we	understand	the	content	of	science	as	being	dependent	and	
tied	to	 the	contingent	facts	about	 the	social	group	in	which	it	 is	produced?	
Those	who	believe	that	we	should	do	this	usually	opt	for	replacing
“…	the	view	 that	observation	and	experiment	play	 the	dominant	 role	 in	 the	 specification	of	
scientific	facts	with	the	view	that	these	processes	involve	collective	negotiations,	interests	and	
the	 infusion	of	experimental	outcomes	with	contingent	features	of	situations.”	(Knorr-Cetina	
1993,	p.	556)
Thus,	they	opt	for	a	social	account	of	the	content	of	science.	These	are	the	
social	constructivists.
1.1. A social constructivism interlude
According	to	social	constructivists,	science	should	be	understood	as	embed-
ded	within	a	certain	socio-cultural	context	 that	determines	 its	 features.	Re-
garding	science	this	way	usually	involves	the	following	considerations:
A. Metaphysical considerations	 –	 the	 objects	 of	 science	 are	 not	 to	 be
found	 in	nature,	but	are	built	by	 the	scientific	community	(i.e.	by	a
group	 of	 people	 organized	 in	 a	 certain	way	 and	 pursuing	 a	 certain
practice),	and	exhibit	particular	values,	interests	and	needs	that	their
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creators	had	at	the	moment	of	their	creation.	This	means	that	“if	sci-
entists	had	chosen	to	confer	facthood	otherwise	than	they	actually	did,	
then	subsequent	history	would	reflect	this	in	a	world-view	consistent	
with	the	choice	they	counterfactually	made”	(Nelson	1994,	p.	541).
B. Epistemological considerations	–	 the	abovementioned	metaphysical
position	goes	well	with	a	social	dependence	conception	of	knowledge,
according	to	which	knowledge	is	relative	and	should	be	analyzed	in
terms	of	the	historical	and	cultural	contexts	that	the	knowledge	pro-
ducer	occupies.	Since	there	are	no	context-free	or	super-cultural	van-
tage	 points	 from	which	 to	 evaluate	 different	 ways	 of	 knowing	 the
world,	we	cannot	do	better	but	to	take	them	as	equally	valid.	“First-
world	science	is	one	science	among	many;	by	claiming	to	be	more	it
chases	to	be	an	instrument	of	research	and	turns	into	a	(political)	pres-
sure	group.”	(Feyerabend	1993,	p.	3)
The	idea	behind	these	two	types	of	considerations	is	that	the	connection	be-
tween	society	and	our	knowledge	of	the	world	should	not	be	treated	lightly.	
Social	and	cultural	contexts	are	considerably	more	important	than	it	was	pre-
viously	presupposed.	Social	constructivists	push	this	relation	beyond,	by	now	
trivial,	common	acceptance	that	science	has	a	social	dimension,	i.e.	that	it	is	
a	social	practice	pursued	collaboratively	by	members	of	a	social	group	which	
can	be	influenced	in	their	work	by	certain	economic,	political	or	social	values.	
This	influence	can	explain,	for	example,	why	a	certain	scientific	community	
is	more	interested	in	certain	problems	than	others	or	why	a	scientist	formu-
lated	a	certain	theoretical	conjecture.	What	the	constructivists	are	claiming	is	
not	that	these	values	influence	the	practice	of	science,	but	that	they	are	affect-
ing	(to	be	read	constructing)	the	very	content	of	science.
Writing	 about	 the	 instrumental	 manufacture	 of	 knowledge	 in	 the	 lab,	 K.	
Knorr-Cetina,	for	example,	argues	that
“…	the	products	of	science	are	contextually	specific	instructions	which	bear	the	mark	of	the	
situational	contingency	and	interest	structure	of	the	processes	by	which	they	are	generated,	and	
which	cannot	be	adequately	understood	without	an	analysis	of	their	construction.”	(Knorr-Ce-
tina	1981,	p.	5)
Thus,	 scientific	 objects	 and/or	 scientific	 knowledge	 are	 constructed.	 But	
what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	something	is	socially	constructed?	What	do	the	
constructivists	have	in	mind	when	they	are	claiming	that	science	is	socially	
constructed?	The	first	answer	 that	comes	 to	our	mind	 is	 that	science	 is	 the	
product	of	 social	practices.	This	 can	be	understood	 in	 two	ways.	First,	we	
can	understand	this	dependence	in	terms	of	social	requirements	necessary	for	
science.	Science	cannot	obtain	in	isolation.	It	needs	collaborative	efforts	of	
the	members	of	a	social	group	living	in	a	society	with	a	certain	structure,	and	
in	 the	context	of	certain	political	and	economic	conditions.	Since	these	are	
necessary	conditions	for	the	appearance	of	science,	we	can	say	that	science	
is	a	social	construction.	But	this	is	trivial	and	in	agreement	with	the	classical	
view	about	science:	it	amounts	to	nothing	more	than	saying	about	scientific	
practice	that	it	is	socially	constituted.
Second	 of	 all,	we	 can	 understand	 this	 claim	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 idea	 that	
something	is	discovered.	When	the	social	constructivists	are	saying	that	sci-
ence	 is	 a	 constructive	activity,	what	 they	have	 in	mind	 is	 that	 the	work	of	
scientists	actually	brings	into	existence	their	domain	of	study	and	that	their	
creative	activity	is	guided	and	determined	by	the	social,	economic,	political	
values,	needs,	and	interests.
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To	better	understand	what	the	constructivists	have	in	mind	when	they	speak	
of	social	constructions,	 let’s	 look	at	 the	 following	example:	gendered	 indi-
viduals	are	social	constructions.	To	say	that	gender	 is	a	social	construction	
is	to	say	that	our	society	constructed	the	concept	of	gender	and	made	gender	
classifications	based	on	this	concept.	Subsequently,	those	to	whom	this	clas-
sification	was	forced	upon	started	to	behave	in	accordance	with	the	classifica-
tion,	exhibiting	the	very	properties	that	the	classification	attributed	them.	This	
results	in	a	type	of	thing	that	wouldn’t	have	existed	in	the	absence	of	certain	
social	creation	processes,	or	if	the	values	or	interests	that	stood	behind	these	
processes	were	different.	Two	things	should	be	noted	about	these	products	of	
social	practices:	they	are	context	dependent	and	value-interest1	impregnated.	
They	are	context	dependent	because	they	would	not	have	existed	under	differ-
ent	(social)	circumstances.	They	are	value-interest	impregnated	in	the	sense	
that	they	are	analyzable	in	terms	of	the	specific	values	and	interests	that	stood	
behind	and	determined	their	apparition.
As	our	example	shows,	it	is	relatively	easy	to	see	how	this	view	about	social	
construction	could	work	in	theories	about	gender,	race,	sexuality,	emotions,	
class,	etc.	Things	get	really	complicated,	though,	when	we	try	to	apply	this	
view	to	science,	and	say	that	the	scientific	objects	are	social	constructions.
We	will	not	pursue	further	the	issue	of	the	way	we	can	reconceptualize	the	ob-
jects	of	science	as	social	constructions	because	this	will	distract	us	too	much	
from	our	aim.	Suffice	to	say	that	there	are	several	accounts	of	the	construction	
processes	in	the	literature	and	that	what	they	have	in	common	is	that	they	at-
tribute	to	the	objects	resulted	as	products	of	the	construction	the	two	charac-
teristics	noted	above:	context	dependence	and	value-interest	impregnation.
The	common	picture	is	that	the	processes	in	which	scientific	objects	are	gen-
erated	can	be	spelled	out	in	terms	of	negotiations	and	decisions,	and	behind	
this	we	can	find	social	values,	interests	and	needs.	Products	of	science	are	de-
cision-laden	and	these	decisions	are	in	turn	value/interest-laden.	This	brings	
to	our	attention	the	following	problem:	the	role	of	values	in	science.	An	in-
teresting	way	to	look	at	the	social-constructivism	issue	is	to	approach	it	by	
looking	to	see	if	values	play	such	a	crucial	role	in	science.
1.2. The role of values in science
Classical	view	about	 the	role	of	values	 in	science	 is	categorical:	science	 is	
value-free.	This	can	be	found	already	in	Galileo’s	discussion	about	“the	facts	
of	Nature,	which	remain	death	and	inexorable	to	our	wishes”	(Galileo	1957,	
p.	 270),	 but	 it	 is	mastered	 by	 logical	 empiricists	who	 contrasted	 scientific	
judgments	with	value	judgments	which	represent	subjective	phenomena	not	
open	to	rational	appraisal	and	thus	lacking	truth	value,	and,	moreso,	are	not	
assertable	in	a	meaningful	statement	at	all	(Carnap	1959,	p.	77).	Our	scientific	
decisions	are	not	value-laden	from	this	perspective:
“The	grounds	on	which	scientific	hypothesis	are	accepted	or	rejected	are	provided	by	empirical	
evidence,	which	may	include	observational	findings	as	well	as	previously	established	laws	and	
theories,	but	surely	no	value-judgments.”	(Hempel	1965,	p.	91)
1
I	use	value	and	interest	here	somewhat	inter-
changeably.	This	will	 allow	me	 to	 recast,	 in	
the	next	 section,	at	 least	a	part	of	 the	social	
constructivism	issue	in	terms	of	the	problem	
of	values	in	science.	The	idea	here	is	that	we	
value	what	we	 are	 interested	 in	 and	we	 are	
interested	 in	 those	 things	 that	 we	 value	 the	
most.	So,	we	can	take	interests	as	being	noth-
ing	 more	 than	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	
way	we	pursue	values.
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Values	can	figure	only	in	the	context	of	discovery,	but	the	part	of	scientific	
practice	that	is	epistemologically	relevant	is	the	context	of	justification.	From	
this	 perspective,	 science	 is	 a	 neutral,	 impartial	 and	 autonomous	 discipline	
whose	aim	is	to	represent	the	world	as	it	is	without	contaminating	it	with	our	
preferences,	needs	and	interests.	As	it	is	well	known,	this	view	came	under	
a	powerful	attack.	First,	the	distinction	between	fact	and	value	was	rejected	
starting	from	Quine’s	work	(in	particular	his	holism).2	Secondly,	Kuhn	em-
phasized	the	pragmatic	factors	in	theory	choice.
How	does	this	relate	to	our	previous	discussion	about	social	constructivism?	
In	two	ways:	one	in	favor	of	social	constructivism,	and	one	against	it.
First,	Thomas	Kuhn	is	usually	pointed	out	as	the	main	source	of	inspiration	
for	constructivism.	If	theory	choice	is	not	determined	by	rational	considera-
tions,	what	else	determines	it?	A	choice	will	be	the	values,	interests	and	needs	
that	drive	any	other	social	decision.	This	opened	the	door	for	a	social	account	
of	the	content	of	science.	The	second	way	this	discussion	bears	on	our	previ-
ous	discussion	is	that	it	is	pointing	us	in	the	direction	of	an	argument	against	
social	constructivism.	The	idea	here	 is	 that	of	distinguishing	between	epis-
temic	values	and	social	values	and	to	take	scientific	decision	making	as	based	
on	the	first	kind	of	values.
If	we	interpret	their	position	in	terms	of	values,	social	constructivists	seem	to	
be	committed	to	the	following	thesis:	the	scientific	practice	is	not	fully	and	
essentially	determined	by	its	own	values	(we	can	name	this	the	flow	of	values	
thesis)3.	This	can	happen	for	two	reasons:	either	there	are	no	values	specific	to	
the	scientific	practice	(the	strong	thesis),	or	there	are	such	values	but	they	are	
overridden	by	social	values,	needs	and	interests	(the	weak	thesis).	Do	these	
theses	make	sense?	
In	its	strong	form,	the	thesis	seems	to	imply	that	we	don’t	have	different	social	
practices	with	their	own	values	and	goals.	What	it	is	at	work	in	science,	as	it	is	
in	other	social	practices,	are	economic,	political	and	social	interests.	But	this	
seems	at	least	implausible,	and	not	just	for	the	case	of	science.
The	first	thing	we	can	observe	about	the	weak	form	of	the	flow	of	values	thesis	
is	that	it	can	be	easily	transformed	into	its	strong	counterpart.	All	we	need	is	to	
deny	that	social	values	can	enter	scientific	decision	making	without	affecting	
the	values	that	define	science	as	an	independent	social	practice.	But	let’s	say	
that	this	is	possible	–	what	the	weak	thesis	implies	is	that	social	values	con-
taminate	scientific	decision	making	and	so	change	the	whole	outcome	of	sci-
entific	practice.	This	is	highly	controversial,	though.	We	normally	see	science	
as	 comprising	 those	 social	practices	 aimed	at	 the	knowledge	of	 the	world,	
hence	at	truth,	and	we	take	the	values	that	shape	these	practices	as	securing	
the	chances	of	attaining	this	goal.	Of	course	that	the	members	of	the	scientific	
community	bring	with	them	certain	political,	economic,	and	social	values	that	
influence	in	certain	respects	how	they	pursue	their	work	but,	normally,	these	
are	either	overridden	by	the	epistemic	values	of	the	community	or	they	don’t	
interfere	with	the	latter	(for	example	if	the	social	values	manifest	themselves	
in	the	choice	of	scientific	problems	and	the	direction	of	scientific	research).	
This	doesn’t	mean	that	the	path	to	truth,	which	is	supposedly	secured	by	the	
epistemic	values	found	in	science,	is	not	easily	distortable.	It	means	only	that	
there	are	such	values	and	they	shape	the	scientific	practice.
There	is	another	way,	though,	for	the	social	constructivists	to	argue	for	their	
doctrine,	which	may	not	seem	to	be	so	problematic.	This	 time,	 their	 target	
is	not	the	values	but	the	goal	that	those	values	are	supposed	to	improve	the	
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chances	of	 attaining.	 Is	 the	goal	of	 science	 really	knowledge?	What	 I	will	
try	to	do4	in	the	next	sections	is	to	show	that	this	view	about	science’s	aim	is	
problematic.
2. Science and society
“Science	does	not	stand	outside	of	society	dispensing	its	gifts	of	knowledge	and	wisdom;	neither	
is	it	an	autonomous	enclave	that	is	now	being	crushed	under	the	weight	of	narrowly	commercial	
or	political	interests.”	(Gibbons	et	al.	1994,	p.	22)
Science	is	resource	dependent.	Besides	 the	time	and	energy	of	researchers,	
it	needs	a	 large	amount	of	 finances	 to	cover	all	 the	costs	generated	by	 the	
research	processes:	starting	from	laboratory	equipment	to	the	salaries.	Now,	
where	does	science	gets	this	money	from?	This	is	an	important	question	be-
cause	it	is	not	hard	to	realize	that,	whoever	controls	resources,	controls	sci-
ence;5	and	through	money	are	 injected	into	 the	system	the	funders’	values:	
their	tastes,	needs,	ethics,	etc.	The	biggest	and	oldest	sponsor	is	society	as	a	
whole,	but	recently	there	are	other	parties	joining	in.	There	are	interest	groups	
that	 invest	 in	science	 through	their	own	research	foundations	and	there	are	
firms	that	develop	in-house	research	programs	or	provide	funds	for	external	
ones.
Is	 scientific	 knowledge	 affected	 by	 this	 resource	 dependency	 of	 science?	
There	is	no	straightforward	answer	to	this	question.	What	we	can	say	with	
certainty	is	only	that	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge	is	sensitive	to	
this	dependency.	Actually,	there	are	recent	sociological	studies	that	draw	our	
attention	to	the	recent	transformations	of	the	nature	of	the	research	process	
that	 takes	 place	 in	 our	 society	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 commercialization	 of	 re-
search.
2.1. The commercialization of research
In	recent	sociology	studies6	we	can	notice	a	growing	interest	towards	a	very	
interesting	phenomenon	which	seems	to	take	the	aspect	of	a	true	revolution:	
the	transformation	of	the	old	paradigm	of	scientific	research	into	a	new	mode	
of	knowledge	production.	According	to	the	main	researchers7	who	have	drawn	
the	attention	upon	this	phenomenon,	the	revolution	consists	in	passing	from	
2
See	for	example	Putnam:	“without	values	we	
don’t	have	a	world”	(Putnam	1990,	p.	141).
3
If	 everything	 revolves	 around	 social	 inter-
ests	and	 is	oriented	 to	 social	goals,	 then	 the	
social	 values	 flow	 throughout	 every	 human	
practice.
4
Actually,	 I’m	 sketching	only	 the	 outlines	 of	
an	argument	because	filling	in	the	details	(ex-
amples,	details	of	different	positions,	extend-
ed	 counterargument	 and	 historical	 support)	
would	 have	 inflated	 the	 paper	 to	 undesired	
proportions.
5
In	the	words	of	an	electrical	engineering	de-
partment’s	chair:	“You	have	to	accept	the	fact	
that	it	[research]	is	going	to	be	driven	by	the	
people	who	give	you	the	money.	[If]	the	state	
gives	us	money,	 they	tell	us	what	 to	do.	[If]	
NSF	 gives	 us	 the	 money,	 they	 tell	 us	 what	
research	 they	want	 done.	 [If]	DoD	gives	 us	
the	money,	[its]	the	government	…	Why	is	it	
any	 different	with	 industry?	 I	 see	 no	 differ-
ence	whatsoever.”	(in	Slaughter	et	al.,	2004,	
p.	135)
6
See	 for	 example	 Scott	 (1999),	 Finnegan	
(2005),	Sörlin	and	Vessuri	(2007), Viale	and	
Roselli	(2010).
7
Gibbons	et	al.	(1994);	Nowotny	et	al.	(2001).
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Mode	1	science	–	homogeneous,	built	on	 theory,	autonomous	and	disinter-
ested	–	to	Mode	2	knowledge	production	–	trans-disciplinary,	contextualized,	
oriented	towards	applications	and	receptive	to	certain	external	factors	such	as	
sociological	problems	and	industrial	priorities.
In	this	context	we	can	notice	a	breaking	down	of	the	boundaries	between	uni-
versity,	industry	and	governments.8
“The	university	takes	the	role	of	industry	by	stimulating	the	development	of	new	firms	from	
research,	 introducing	 ‘the	 capitalization	 of	 knowledge’	 as	 an	 academic	 goal.	 Firms	 develop	
training	 to	 ever	 higher	 levels	 and	 share	 knowledge	 through	 joint	 ventures,	 acting	 a	 bit	 like	
universities.	Governments	 act	 as	 public	 venture	 capitalists	while	 continuing	 their	 regulatory	
activities.”	(Etzkowitz	2008,	p.	1)
The	new	entrepreneurial	science	assumes	as	a	core	value	the	participation	in	
the	process	of	economic	development	and	becomes	a	veritable	economic	ac-
tor	committed	to	making	money.
The	outcome	of	these	transformations	is	that	knowledge	becomes	valued	in	
terms	of	the	profit-potential	that	it	has	on	the	market.	It	is	no	longer	a	pub-
lic	good,	but	an	“intellectual	property”	which	can	be	commercialized	as	any	
other	goods	and	services.	This	changes	completely	not	only	the	way	scientists	
view	the	results	of	their	activity,	but	also	the	very	nature	of	this	activity	as	
they	tend	and	are	stimulated	to	become	more	focused	on	the	socio-economic	
aspect	of	their	research:	scientific	research	has	become	–	under	these	circum-
stances	–	a	socio-economic	enterprise.9
How	does	this	recently	assumed	function	affects	the	other	roles	of	scientific	
research?	What	we	know	for	sure	is	that	it	can	change	completely	the	choice	
of	scientific	problems.	But	does	it	interfere	with	the	epistemological	function	
of	science?
2.2. Truth, adequacy, profit…
The	new	process	of	knowledge	production	depicted	in	the	last	section	sug-
gests	an	interesting	way	to	argue	for	a	social	constructivist	view	on	science.	In	
order	to	see	this,	we	need	to	make	a	short	detour	to	look	at	the	dispute	between	
scientific	realists	and	their	opponents.
What	is	scientific	realism?	This	is	a	difficult	question	since	the	philosophical	
literature	comprises	a	whole	galaxy	of	doctrines	that	can	be	placed	under	this	
label.	A	way	to	order	this	variety	of	realist	views	is	on	the	basis	of	the	theses	
that	are	taken	to	best	characterize	them.	We	can	distinguish	between	the	fol-
lowing	realist	theses:
A. The ontological thesis –	 expresses	 the	 scientific	 realist’s	 belief	 that	
most	of	 the	unobservable	entities	postulated	 in	a	 (mature)	scientific	
context	populate	the	world	as	well	as	observable	objects	do.
B.	 The semantic thesis	–	takes	the	theoretical	claims	about	the	unobserv-
ables	as	being,	as	well	as	those	about	observables,	truth-conditioned	
descriptions	of	an	independent	reality.
C.	 The epistemological thesis	–	is	making	explicit	the	trust	that	scientific	
theories	 are	 our	 best	 sources	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	whole	world:	
observable	and	unobservable.
D.	 The axiological thesis	–	presents	science	as	aiming	at	true	theories.
Most	scientific	realists	prefer	to	present	their	position	as	a	research	program	
comprising	several	of	these	theses	(usually	the	first	three),	but	there	are	phi-
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losophers	who	choose	only	one	of	them	as	constitutive	for	the	central	aspects	
of	their	view.
Let’s	focus	on	the	realist	view	expressed	with	the	help	of	the	axiological	thesis.	
Between	those	who	choose	to	see	realism	in	an	axiological	light	is	Bas	van	Fraas-
sen.	He	takes	the	following	to	be	the	correct	statement	of	scientific	realism:
S.R.:	“Science	aims	to	give	us,	in	its	theories,	a	literally	true	story	of	what	
the	world	is	like;	and	acceptance	of	a	scientific	theory	involves	the	belief	
that	it	is	true.”	(van	Fraassen	1980,	p.	8)
To	this,	he	opposes	the	following	anti-realist	position:
C.E.:	“Science	aims	to	give	us	theories	which	are	empirically	adequate;	
and	acceptance	of	a	theory	involves	as	belief	only	that	it	is	empirically	
adequate.”	(van	Fraassen	1980,	p.	12)
Does	what	we	have	said	above	about	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge	
influence	in	any	way	the	debate	between	scientific	realists	and	anti-realists	
as	it	is	cast	in	van	Fraassen’s	terms?	It	surely	does	seem	so.	To	see	this,	let’s	
reformulate	 the	 above	 realist	 axiological	 thesis	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	
discussion	from	our	previous	section	about	the	capitalization	of	knowledge.	
We	have	the	following	thesis:
C.K.R:	Science aims to give us market competitive and social relevant 
results, and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is 
true.
At	first	sight,	the	first	part	doesn’t	seem	to	be	compatible	with	what	follows.	
After	all,	what	has	market	competitiveness	to	do	with	truth?	If	anything,	 it	
seems	to	stand	in	the	way	of	uninterested,	autonomous,	and	objective	truth	
seeking	activities.	Besides,	if	you	don’t	search	for	something,	what	chances	
do	you	have	of	finding	it?	If	our	current	science	turned	its	interest	away	from	
truth,	can	we	still	find	it	between	the	scientific	results?	An	affirmative	answer	
to	this	question	would	presuppose	an	exaggerated	view	about	the	constraints	
that	the	world	imposes	upon	our	theoretic	activities.	Should	we	then	reformu-
late	the	second	part	of	this	thesis	along	the	lines	traced	by	the	above	anti-real-
ist	position?	Does	the	following	thesis	make	more	sense?
C.K.E:	Science aims to give us market competitive and social relevant 
results; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves as belief only that 
it is empirically adequate.
8
This	phenomenon	is	usually	referred	to	as	the	
triple	helix:	“As	these	three	institutional	sec-
tors	(public,	private	and	academic)	interact,	a	
spiral	pattern	of	 linkages	emerges	at	various	
stages	of	the	innovation	process”	(Etzkowitz	
2002,	p.	139).
9
Not	 everyone	 sees	 these	 things	 in	 the	 same	
colors.	Etzkowitz,	for	example,	takes	the	uni-
versities’	assumption	of	economic	and	social	
missions	as	an	extension	and	normal	continu-
ation	of	its	previous	functions	of	teaching	and	
research:	“The	first	academic	mission	of	edu-
cation	 implies	 a	 second	mission	 of	 research	
that	 in	 turn	 propels	 a	 third	 mission	 of	 eco-
nomic	 and	 social	 development”	 (Etzkowitz	
2008,	 p.	 30).	 See	 also	 Viale	 and	 Rosselli:	
“Academic	communities	are	fearful	that	capi-
talization	will	diminish	the	university	goal	of	
knowledge	production	per se.	This	fear	seems	
to	be	linked	to	a	traditional	image	of	the	divi-
sion	of	labor	in	universities.	Curiosity-driven	
research	is	separated	from	technology-driven	
research.	 Therefore,	 if	 a	 university	 focuses	
on	 the	 latter,	 it	 handicaps	 and	 weakens	 the	
former.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 our	 opinion,	 in	
many	technological	fields	knowledge	produc-
tion	simultaneously	encompasses	various	as-
pects	of	research”	(Viale	and	Rosselli	2010,	p.	
3).	My	reasons	for	not	adopting	this	approach	
will	be	exposed	in	the	next	section.
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
64	(2/2017)	pp.	(449–466)
G.	Tȃrziu,	 Social	Constructivism	 and	Me-
thodology	of	Science456
Settling	for	this	second	position	only	on	the	basis	of	what	we	have	said	so	far	
would	be,	of	course,	too	hasty.	Someone	can	object,	for	example,	that	C.K.R 
would	make	more	sense	if	we	add,	as	we	should	have	done	in	the	first	place,	
the	search	for	knowledge	as	the	primary	aim	of	science.	The	capitalization	of	
knowledge	doesn’t	replace	the	original	aim	of	science,	but	adds	to	it,	trans-
forms	it.	After	all,	what	gets	used	as	a	marketable	product	or	a	means	to	to	
solve	social	problems	are	the	results	obtained	by	science	from	its	knowledge	
seeking	activities.	The	old	(main)	aim	of	science	is	retained,	what	changes	is	
the	way	this	aim	is	taken.	Knowledge	no	longer	represents	a	goal	in	itself,	but	
a	resource	valued	for	its	utility	in	and	relevance	for	extra-scientific	contexts.	
But	putting	scientific	knowledge	to	work,	exploiting	it	for	its	socio-economic	
implications	doesn’t	mean	abandoning	it	as	an	aim.	Thus,	this	thesis	should	
look	like	this:
C.K.*R: Science aims [mostly] at market competitive and social relevant 
knowledge of the world; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the 
belief that it is true.
As	in	the	realist	position	(S.R.	above),	the	aim	here	is	truth,	and	we	no	longer	
have	any	compatibility	issues	between	the	first	part	and	the	rest	of	this	thesis.	
What	is	different	in	C.K.*R is	the	type	of	knowledge	science	is	after:	instead	
of	knowledge	for	knowledge’s	sake,	we	have	knowledge	for	benefit.	The	capi-
talization	of	knowledge	makes	science	more	sensitive	to,	and	more	concerned	
with	what	can	be	done	with	its	results,	but	it	doesn’t	take	it	out	of	the	truth	
seeking	business,	 so	we	don’t	need	 to	abandon	a	 realist	position	and	adopt	
some	sort	of	empiricism	(C.K.E thesis	above)	just	because	of	it.	Or	do	we?
Unfortunately	 for	 the	 scientific	 realist,	 things	 are	 not	 that	 simple.	 If	 truth-
seeking	would	have	not	been	such	an	opaque	and	mysterious	process,	so	that	
we	could	say	easily	what	counts	as	a	good	method	for	finding	it	and	what	not,	
the	realist	would	have	been	in	a	much	better	position,	but	things	are	far	from	
simple	when	we	take	into	consideration	scientific	truth	(the	anti-realists	of-
fer	us	plenty	of	reasons	for	doubting	that	we	can	struck	truth	in	our	scientific	
endeavors).
2.3. Methods and aims
Can	we	say	with	certainty	that	the	scientific	methodology	represents	a	reliable	
tool	for	arriving	at	approximately	true	theories	about	the	world,	or	do	we	have	
to	accept	that	all	we	can	get	from	it	is	empirically	adequate	theories?	Richard	
Boyd	offers	a	realist	answer	to	this	question.	He	takes	as	a	starting	point	in	his	
argument	the	instrumental	reliability	of	scientific	methodology	and	points	to	a	
realistic	account	of	scientific	theories	as	being	the	only	scientifically	plausible	
explanation	for	it.	We	can	reconstruct	his	argument	this	way:
(i)	 Nobody	denies	the	fact	that	we	have	instrumentally	reliable	theories,	
i.e.	theories	that	are	empirically	adequate	(or	that	save	the	phenom-
ena	in	van	Fraassen’s	words).
(ii)	 We	arrived	at	these	theories	by	using	a	certain	scientific	methodo-
logy.
(iii)		But	 the	 principles	 that	 stand	 behind	 this	methodology	 are	 theory-
laden.
(iv)	 We	know	that,	so	far,	this	scientific	methodology	is	very	successful	
in	providing	us	with	increasingly	good	predictive	theories.
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(v)	 From	(i)	and	(iv)	we	can	say	that	our	methodology	is	instrumentally	
reliable.
(vi)	 But,	in	order	to	have	an	explanation	for	(v),	keeping	in	mind	what	we	
have	said	at	(iii),	we	have	to	accept	that	our	scientific	theories	–	the	
same	ones	that	are	behind	and	lead	to	improvements	in	methodology	
–	are	more	 than	empirically	adequate,	 that	 they	are	approximately	
true.	In	Boyd’s	words:	“A	satisfactory	naturalistic	answer	regarding	
the	instrumental	reliability	of	each	of	 these	methodological	princi-
ples10	 is	 available	 if	one	assumes	 that	 they	apply	 in	 a	 situation	 in	
which	 the	relevant	background	theories	are	approximately	 true	[as	
well	as	instrumentally	reliable].”	(Boyd	1980,	p.	621)
C:	Our	scientific	theories	are	not	only	empirically	adequate;	they	are	ap-
proximately	true.	Thus,	what	we	have	in	science,	in	Boyd’s	view,	is	a	sort	
of	dialectical	process:
“Our	methodology,	based	on	approximately	true	theories,	would	be	a	reliable	guide	to	the	dis-
covery	of	new	results	and	the	improvement	of	older	theories.	The	resulting	improvements	in	our	
knowledge	of	the	world	would	result	in	a	still	more	reliable	methodology	leading	to	still	more	
accurate	theories,	and	so	on.”	(Boyd	1983,	p.	65)
Can	we	recast	Boyd’s	argument	in	a	context	similar	to	that	of	the	capitaliza-
tion	of	knowledge?	I	think	not.	If	we	take	into	consideration	the	change	of	
goal	that	accompanies	the	new	mode	of	knowledge	production,	we	have	good	
reasons	to	suspect	that	the	dialectical	process,	that	represents	the	core	of	sci-
ence	in	Boyd’s	view,	fails.	In	this	context,	we	can	no	longer	speak	about	new	
theoretical	 knowledge	 leading	 to	 improvements	 in	methodology	which,	 in	
turn,	 leads	 to	better	(in	 terms	of	approximating	truth)	 theories,	because	 the	
methodology	is	no	longer	affected	only	by	or	shaped	according	to	new	theo-
retical	knowledge.	There	are	other	things	sneaking	in.
To	better	understand	what	we	are	dealing	with	here,	let’s	take	a	look	at	sci-
entific	methodology.	What	do	we	have	in	mind	when	we	speak	of	a	method?	
Usually,	a	method	is	a	prescription	telling	how	to	do	something	in	a	certain	
way	or	by	a	special	procedure.	Thus,	we	can	have	methods	for	almost	every	
activity,	ranging	from	the	simplest	like	drinking	tea	to	the	most	complex	like	
building	space	shuttles.	The	relation	between	methods	and	these	activities	is	
complex:	methods	can	play	different	roles,	from	improving	the	outcome	of	
an	activity	(either	by	making	it	socially	acceptable,	e.g.	drinking	tea	or	eating	
in	a	certain	way,	or	by	bringing	the	result	closer	to	one’s	wishes)	to	making	
possible	a	certain	activity	(there	are	complex	and	complicated	activities	that	
are	impossible	without	a	method	that	tells	exactly	what	to	do	at	each	step	of	
the	process).
A	thing	that	all	methods	have	in	common	is	the	strong	bond	to	some	ends.	
Every	method	is	specially	designed	for	 the	realization	of	some	goal,	and	it	
consists	of	the	set	of	rules	one	has	has	to	follow	in	order	to	reach	that	goal.	
From	 this	 perspective,	 one	 can	 represent	methods	 as	 some	 sort	 of	 impera-
tives:
I. M.: You ought to do X, if you aim at Y [where	X	can	be	taken	as	a	set	
of	rules].
10
The	principles	Boyd	 is	 referring	 to	 here	 are	
the	 extra-experimental	 principles	 (i.e.	 those	
different	from	consistency	with	observational	
data)	at	work	in	theory	choice.
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The	problem	with	 this	 representation	 is	 that	 it	 is	 too	 restrictive.	Not	every	
method	can	be	thought	of	as	a	sort	of	imperative	because	not	every	aim	is	so	
straightforward	realizable	or	attainable	with	the	help	of	a	method	–	either	be-
cause	the	aim	is	too	vague11	(and	not	knowing	exactly	what	you	want	prevents	
you	from	finding	a	method	that	can	deliver)	or	it	is	too	complicated	(and	it	is	
no	simple	business	to	find	out	what	you	have	to	do	in	order	to	attain	it).	This	
leaves	room	for	methods	that	only	improve	the	chances	of	reaching	a	certain	
goal.	These	methods	are	more	like	guidelines	that	can’t	do	more	than	set	one	
on	what	seems	to	be	the	right	path	towards	the	desired	aim.	Instead	of	a	set	of	
rules,	these	methods	consist	of	a	set	of	values,	i.e.	things	that	is	desirable	to	
pursue	given	a	certain	aim.	We	can	understand	these	methods	as	having	this	
form:
G. M.: If you want Y, then you should want X also, because, from what we 
know, doing X improves the chances of attaining Y [where	X	can	be	taken	
as	a	set	of	values].
This	 formulation	 (especially	 the	 “from	what	we	know”	part)	 brings	 to	 the	
forefront	 another	 characteristic	 shared	 by	 all	 methods:	 the	 dependence	 of	
some	background	knowledge.	The	means	one	finds	for	realizing	certain	aims	
are	strongly	dependent	on	the	context	in	which	they	are	looked	for,	and	this	
because,	first	of	all,	methods	can	be	found	(are	possible)	only	if	the	right	con-
text	presents	itself	(e.g.	building	a	space	shuttle	would	have	not	been	possible	
outside	the	context	of	the	20th	century	science),	and	second,	different	context	
can	lead	to	different	methods	or	to	improvements	in	existing	ones.
Now	it	is	a	good	time	to	return	to	Boyd’s	argument.	His	view	on	the	dialecti-
cal	relationship	between	scientific	methodology	and	scientific	 theories	cor-
responds	broadly	to	what	we	have	just	said	about	the	context	dependency	of	
methods	in	general.	What	is	missing	from	his	picture	is	the	importance	goals	
play	in	shaping	a	certain	methodology:	a	methodology	is	not	only	theory-de-
pendent	but	it	is	aim-sensitive	as	well	and	the	slightest	change	in	aim	can	have	
considerable	effects	on	 the	associated	method.	So	why	did	Boyd	disregard	
the	importance	of	aims	in	the	shaping	of	the	scientific	methodology?	I	don’t	
think	he	did.	He	took	the	aim	of	science	as	constant	throughout	history	(as	
fixed)	–	as	most	realists	do	–	and	so	it	was	just	uninteresting	to	bring	it	into	
discussion:	what	changes	 is	only	 the	 theoretical	context	 in	which	scientific	
methods	are	forged	in	the	struggle	to	strip	the	world	out	of	its	truth.	But	this	
impression,	i.e.	that	the	same	struggle	(in	terms	of	aim)	dates	back	to	the	be-
ginning	of	science,	is	mistaken	–	it	originates	in	an	idealized	view	on	science	
that	doesn’t	 take	into	consideration	its	socio-historical	evolution.	Compare,	
for	example,	Newton’s	or	Boyle’s	semi-theological	aims	with	the	present-day	
view	about	what	science	aims	and	should	aim	at.	Do	we	have	the	same	thing?	
Some	will	say	we	do:	in	both	cases	we	have	as	the	main	aim	the	search	for	
true	theories	about	the	world	–	everything	else	is	unimportant.	I	disagree,	but	
I	am	not	going	to	take	the	historical	path	here	and	try	to	provide	examples	in	
support	of	my	position.	Actually,	that	won’t	work	very	well,	because	showing	
that	throughout	history	scientists	had	different	views	about	the	goal	of	science	
doesn’t	do	much	in	terms	of	assessing	the	impact	(if	any)	these	differences	
had	on	the	content	of	science.	More	than	that,	someone	can	easily	reply	to	
such	an	undertaking	 that,	what	 the	historian	 identifies	 as	different	goals	 is	
actually	the	same	goal	(search	for	true	theories	about	the	world)	cosmeticized	
with	all	kind	of	things	that	are	not	concerned	with	the	content	of	science,	and	
are	best	treated	under	the	heading	“extrinsic	values”.
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A	better	way	to	understand	the	importance	aims	play	(especially	aim	differ-
ences	–	even	the	small	and	seemingly	unimportant	ones)	in	the	shaping	of	the	
content	of	science	is	to	look	at	their	relation	with	the	means	we	normally	use	
for	attaining	them.	Returning	to	our	previous	talk,	we	can	say	about	methods	
that	they	are	doubly	dependent:	on	the	knowledge	context	they	are	created	in	
and	on	the	aim	they	are	meant	to	fulfill.	Depending	on	the	aim	we	can	dis-
tinguish	between	imperative methods	and	guideline methods.	Those	methods	
that	are	known	 to	deliver	 the	aim	every	 time	 they	are	 (correctly)	used	can	
be	dubbed	imperative	methods,	because	the	steps	one	takes	or	the	rules	one	
follows	in	accordance	with	such	methods	can	be	formulated	as	some	sort	of	
imperatives.	The	most	important	prerequisite	for	such	methods	is	that	the	aim	
that	they	are	linked	to	is	clear	(we	have	to	know	exactly	what	we	want	if	we	
are	to	find	ways	that	can	deliver).	But	not	every	aim	is	this	way.	We	some-
times	have	vague	goals,	i.e.	we	want	things	we	don’t	really	know	much	about.	
This	brings	into	attention	the	second	type	of	methods,	because	the	most	we	
can	do	when	we	are	on	the	path	towards	an	unknown,	obscure	and	elusive	end	
is	to	rely	on	something	that	seems	to	capture	all	the	good	characteristics	of	
what	we	feel	is	the	right	direction.
Now,	doesn’t	this	talk	about	vague,	obscure,	unknown,	and	elusive	ends	ring	
a	bell?	Doesn’t	it	remind	us	about	the	seemingly	unchanged	goal	of	science:	
truth	about	the	world	–	this	beast	that	the	methods	of	science	are	supposed	to	
tame?	For	those	inclined	to	answer	negatively	to	this	question,	I	must	specify	
that	I’m	not	saying	that	there	isn’t	such	a	thing	or	that	it	is	in	principle	an	end	
we	cannot	reach.	Actually,	I	am	making	the	most	modest	of	claims:	we	are	far	
from	having	a	clear	picture	about	what	“truth	about	the	world”	amounts	to.	
As	evidence	for	this	stand	all	the	“good”	past	scientific	theories	that	are	lying	
now	in	the	scientific	mausoleum.	But	there	is	nothing	here	that	a	scientific	
realist	will	not	agree	with.	Every	realist	nowadays	will	avoid	taking	scientific	
theories	as	true	descriptions	of	something	(no	matter	how	much	they	want	to	
do	that),	because	we	can	no	longer	say	about	a	theory	that	it	offers	us	a	true	
story	about	 the	world	without	sounding	ridiculous.	Claiming	that	 implies	a	
complete	ignorance	towards	the	history	of	science,	i.e.	to	the	fact	that	all	our	
past	scientific	theories	have	turned	out	to	be	false,	and	to	Popper’s	teachings	
about	the	fact	that	we	can	never	know	if	a	theory	is	true.	Instead	of	truth,	they	
use	concepts	as	Popper’s	verisimilitude	or	the	concept	of	approximate	truth	
and	 interpret	 past	 theories	 as	 approximately	 true	 or	 see	 truth	 as	 being	 ap-
proached	by	the	increasing	verisimilitude	of	such	theories.
Science	aims	at	true	theories	about	the	world,	but	we	have	no	idea	what	that	
is.	Or	do	we?	Most	realists	will	disagree	with	this	claim:	by	true	theories	about	
the	world,	we	mean	theories	that	give	us	accurate	accounts	about	the	causal	
structure	of	the	world.	A	reply	might	be	that	they	are	more	than	that;	they	are	
theories	that	give	us	knowledge	of	the	intrinsic	natures	of	physical	(observable	
and	unobservable)	objects.	To	counterpoint,	one	might	say	that	they	are	about	
the	natural	kinds	of	objects,	properties	and	processes	and	their	real	essences.	
But	wait,	there	are	no	objects	or	essences	or	any	kind	of	individual	things,	so	
they	can	only	be	about	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world.	Thus,	which	
one	is	it?	What	can	we	replace	“the	world”	with	in	the	above	formulation	of	
11
Vague	here	doesn’t	 relate	 in	any	way	 to	 the	
discussion	about	vague	terms	in	the	philoso-
phy	of	language.
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the	aim	of	science?	Is	it	the	objects,	the	essences	and	their	kinds,	the	funda-
mental	laws,	the	causal	structure	or	the	nomological	structure?	Of	course,	it	
would	be	pure	madness	to	try	to	answer	this	question.	The	point	here	is	that,	
even	though,	at	first	sight,	“about	the	world”	seems	to	convey	a	precise	and	
clear	meaning,	is	actually	as	vague	and	obscure	as	it	gets.
We	will	say	it	again	then:	science	aims	at	true	theories	about	the	world,	but	
we	have	no	idea	what	that	is.	We	have	no	idea	what	a	true	theory	will	look	
like,	and	we	have	no	hope	of	 finding	such	a	 thing.	The	most	we	can	hope	
for	 is	 truth-approximations	 or	 truth-likeness	 or	 verisimilitude	 or	 whatever	
other	substitutes	for	truth	we	prefer	in	order	to	deal	with	all	the	idealizations,	
approximations,	simplifications	used	in	scientific	theories	and	all	the	errors	
present	in	the	scientific	practice.	But	truth-substitutes	do	come	with	their	own	
problems	which	don’t	do	us	any	good	when	it	comes	to	having	a	clear	picture	
about	what	we	are	looking	for	in	science.	But	this	is	not	all.	In	addition,	we	
have	no	 idea	what	 the	 “world”,	 that	 the	 scientific	 theories	 presumably	 are	
about,	amounts	to	in	this	context.
Thus,	what	science	aims	at	after	all?	Well,	we	could	say	that	science	aims	at	
something	that	we	know	we	cannot	have	about	something	we	know	nothing	
about.	I	take	this	to	be	the	real	meaning	of	the	following	phrase:	science	aims	
to	reveal	the	secrets	of	nature.
Let’s	get	back	now	to	our	previous	discussion	about	methodology	and	ask	
ourselves:	what	does	all	this	say	about	what	happens	in	science?	What	kind	
of	methods	do	we	find	there?	Well,	if	I’m	right	and	science	has	one	of	the	
vaguest	aims	you	can	find,	then	the	only	kind	of	methods	we	will	find	in	
science	are	guideline	methods	and	so	the	activity	of	science	would	be	a	lax	
sort	of	undertaking.	But	 this	 strikes	us	as	a	completely	mistaken	picture.	
Scientific	practice	seems	to	be	replete	with	rules	that	are	part	of	methods	
for	specific	activities.	Scientists	don’t	seem	to	rely	only	on	(or	follow	just)	
some	guidelines	when	conducting	an	experiment	 for	 testing	 the	outcome	
predicted	by	some	theory,	for	example,	or	for	measuring	a	certain	quantity	
–	 they	 are	 following	 strict	 rules	 that	 guarantee	 that	 the	 outcome	of	 their	
activity	is	accepted	by	their	(scientific)	community	and	considered	scien-
tific.	But	there	is	no	way	these	rules	could	have	been	forged	in	the	context	
of	 a	 practice	with	 such	 a	 vague	 aim	 that	 science	 presumably	 has,	 right?	
Wrong.	If	all	that	matters	is	what	the	scientific	community	accepts,	i.e.	if	
we	translate	this	in	terms	of	some	sort	of	social	acceptability,	then	every-
thing	is	possible.	I	am	not	willing	to	take	this	path,	though,	that	is	why	I	
will	 reformulate	 the	 last	phrase	 so	 that	 it	won’t	 lead	us	 in	 that	direction:	
when	calculating,	making	observations,	conducting	experiments	or	pursu-
ing	whatever	 other	 activities	 they	 are	 involved	 in,	 scientists	 are	 obeying	
rules	designed	to	ensure	the	success	of	their	practice.	A	good	question	here	
would	be:	what	kind	of	success?	If	not	social	success,	then	what?	A	simple	
(and	neutral)	answer	would	be	success	in	interacting	in	certain	ways	with	
certain	specific	aspects	or	our	surroundings.	But	where	do	these	rules	for	
interacting	with	our	surroundings	come	from?	They	form	imperative	meth-
ods	 that	 seem	unlikely	 to	 be	 generated	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 aim	of	
science	as	described	above.
An	obvious	way	out	here	would	be	to	take	this	problem	as	evidence	that	sci-
ence	has	another	aim.	“The	search	for	true	theories	about	the	world”	as	the	
aim	of	 science	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 realist’s	wishful	 thinking	which	doesn’t	
come	even	close	to	what	really	happens	in	science	(as	the	above	discussion	
seems	to	suggest).	Science	doesn’t	aim	at	truth,	it	doesn’t	struggle	to	reveal	
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the	secrets	of	nature,	but	it’s	searching	for	better	ways	of	dealing	(in	terms	
of	controlling,	transforming,	predicting	its	behavior)	with	our	surroundings.	
This	 is	 a	way	more	 tractable	goal	 that	 fits	better	with	 the	 image	projected	
by	the	scientific	practice	(i.e.	with	the	imperative	methods	that	govern	what	
seems	to	be	the	main	scientific	activity:	interacting	in	certain	ways	with	our	
surroundings).
I	don’t	think	this	is	a	good	escaping	route	from	the	above	difficulty,	though.	
Actually,	I	don’t	think	we	have	a	difficulty	at	all.	The	apparent	tension	be-
tween	what	the	goal	of	science	(the	realist	version)	implies	(in	terms	of	meth-
odology),	 and	what	 the	practice	of	 science	presents	us	with	was	generated	
by	the	fact	that	we	looked	in	the	wrong	place	for	an	assessment.	In	order	to	
diffuse	 the	 tension,	 it	 is	sufficient	 to	acknowledge	 the	existence	of	 the	fol-
lowing	rough	divide	between	 two	 types	of	scientific	practices:	 interaction-
ist practices	(making	observations,	experimenting	or	applying	theories),	and	
theoretic practices	(theory	creation	and	theory	assessment).	The	interactionist	
practices	are	based	on	and	derive	from	the	theoretical	context	generated	by	
the	theoretical	practices,	but	the	methods	that	shape	these	practices	shouldn’t	
be	related	to	the	overarching	goal	of	science	but	to	the	theoretical	constraints	
acting	on	them.	The	overarching	aim	has	a	direct	relation	only	to	the	theoretic	
part	of	the	scientific	practice.	But	it	is	well	known	that	this	part	is	methodo-
logically	flawed.	Thus,	the	fact	that	the	goal	of	science	is	so	vague,	obscure	
or	elusive	is	perfectly	compatible	with	the	scientific	practice.	No	tension	here	
and	no	need	to	search	for	a	more	tractable	goal.
Let’s	return	to	Boyd	one	final	time.	Why	is	all	this	discussion	about	the	aim	
of	science	and	its	relation	with	scientific	methodology	and	scientific	practice	
relevant	for	our	main	objective	in	this	section	(i.e.	to	show	that	Boyd’s	argu-
ment	 fails	 in	 a	 context	 similar	 to	 that	of	 the	capitalization	of	knowledge)?	
As	we	said	earlier,	in	Boyd’s	case,	we	have	a	fixed,	clear,	objective,	not	so-
cially-related,	realist	aim	of	science12	and	some	background	knowledge	that	
together	represent	the	context	in	which	our	scientific	methodology	is	gener-
ated;	methodology	that	leads	to	increasingly	accurate	theories	about	the	world	
which,	in	turn,	become	background	knowledge	for	a	new	cycle	that	will	get	
us	even	closer	to	the	truth	(see	fig.	1).	But	as	our	subsequent	discussion	tried	
to	show,	the	aim	of	science	is	far	from	being	clear	and	fixed.	If	we	can	show	
that	this	aim	is	socially	related	as	well,	we	have	a	strong	case	against	Boyd,	
because	we	can	argue	that	the	above	dialectical	process	doesn’t	actually	get	
us	close	to	the	truth.
Fig.	1
Is	the	goal	of	science	socially	related?	Not	really,	no.	Even	though	it	doesn’t	
have	 the	most	 fortunate	of	aims,	 it	does	have	a	stable	one:	science	 tries	 to	
12
Boyd	doesn’t	mention	such	a	thing	in	his	ar-
gument,	but	I	take	it	as	a	hidden	presupposi-
tion	of	it.
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reveal	 the	 secrets	 of	 nature	 no	matter	what	 social	 setting	 is	 enveloping	 its	
practice.	But,	as	our	previous	discussion	about	the	capitalization	of	knowl-
edge	showed,	this	aim	is	sometimes	coupled	with	other,	socially	determined/
relevant,	goals.	In	this	context,	instead	of	aiming	just	at	revealing	the	secrets	
of	nature,	science	has	a	more	focalized	aim:	not	every	secret	of	nature	will	
do.	What	our	society	is	requesting	from	science	is	to	unveil	more	of	those	se-
crets	that	are	useful	in	solving	social	problems	or	that	have	industry/economy	
boosting	potential.	Now,	the	effects	that	this	coupling	has	on	science	are	not	
content-related,	and	thus	they	shouldn’t	be	given	too	much	epistemological	
attention.	 If	we	 look	 at	 it	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 our	 previously	 sketched	
relationship	between	aims	and	methods,	we	can	capture	this	remark	in	terms	
of	the	following	dissociation	between	the	values	that	the	guideline	methods	
consist	in:	intrinsic values	and	extrinsic values.	We	call	intrinsic	those	values	
that	are	directly	related	(in	terms	of	contributing	to	attaining	it)	to	the	desired	
aim.	Extrinsic	values,	on	the	other	hand,	are	those	values	that	do	not	affect	the	
path	towards	the	aim,	but	that	are	telling	us	how	we	should	take	it	and	what	to	
do	with	the	results.	In	our	case,	market	competitiveness	and	social	relevance	
function	as	extrinsic	values	determinators	that	don’t	interfere	with	more	im-
portant	aspects	of	our	scientific	methodology.
Unfortunately,	things	are	far	from	being	that	simple.	There	is	a	problem	that	
prevents	 us	 from	 following	 the	 above	 reasoning	 about	 the	 epistemological	
attention	that	socially	determined	scientific	goal	alterations	should	enjoy:	the	
fact	that	the	goal	of	science	is	so	vague	puts	us	in	difficulty	when	it	comes	to	
distinguishing	between	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	values.	Remember	that	the	role	
of	values	in	the	guideline	methods	case	was	to	capture	all	the	good	character-
istics	of	what	we	feel	is	the	right	direction	towards	a	desired	aim.	But	finding	
a	good	path	towards	a	vague	aim	is	not	an	easy	job.	That	is	why	when	we	have	
a	compound	goal,	vagueness	can	be	taken	as	weakness:	the	less	vague	part	of	
the	compound	will	have	priority	over	the	rest	in	determining	the	values	that	
the	methods	should	consist	in.	We	will	always	be	tempted	to	go	(value-wise)	
towards	the	better	known	end	even	though	is	not	our	main	aim	(especially	in	a	
context	in	which,	due	to	the	vagueness	of	our	main	aim,	it	is	hard	to	tell	what	
counts	as	a	deviation	from	the	path	towards	it).
We	can	illustrate	this	point	by	looking	at	the	following	example:	If you want 
market competitive and social relevant knowledge of the world, then you 
should prefer scientific theories that exhibit the following virtues…, because, 
from what we know, this kind of values improves the chances of attaining your 
goal.	The	dots	here	should	be	replaced	with	a	set	of	extrinsic	and	 intrinsic	
values	that	compose	our	method	in	this	case.	The	extrinsic	values	will	have	to	
do	with	those	things	that	ensure	that	our	theoretic	results	have	economic	po-
tential	and	social	relevancy,	and	the	intrinsic	part	with	knowledge.	Consider	
now	the	following	two	situations:
(a)	 our	scientific	practice	comes	up	with	a	theoretic	result	that	satisfies	in	
an	evident,	undeniable	fashion	the	extrinsic	values	set	up	for	science	
by	this	social	setting,	but	doesn’t	excels	when	it	comes	to	the	intrinsic	
part	 (it	doesn’t	conflict	with	any	value,	but	 is	also	hard	 to	 tell	 if	 it	
satisfies	them);
(b)	 we	have	a	theory	that	doesn’t	satisfy	classical	intrinsic	methodologi-
cal	value,	say	simplicity,	but	is	particularly	fruitful	in	technological	
results	 (i.e.	we	have	a	 complex	but	 technologically	 /	 economically	
fruitful	theory).
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What	kind	of	decision	will	presumably	be	taken	in	these	cases?	I	have	strong	
doubts	that	our	scientific	community	would	decide	to	abandon	either	one	of	
the	above	theoretical	results.	What	would	determine	such	a	rejection?	In	both	
cases	we	have	strong	(social)	reasons	to	accept	the	theories	and	we	are	uncer-
tain	about	the	reasons	to	dislike	them	(we	are	far	from	being	sure	that	simpli-
city,	for	example,	is	such	a	good	right	path	indicator).
What	this	suggests	is	that	extrinsic	(socially	related)	values	are	far	from	being	
epistemologically	 irrelevant:	 they	affect	 in	a	 straightforward	way	scientific	
decision	making,	and	so	they	affect	the	very	content	of	science.	This	doesn’t	
amount	to	saying	that	epistemic	values	(truth	/	justification	related	values)	are	
not	the	main	players	in	scientific	decisions,	but	that	they	can	easily	become	
compatible	with	other	(possibly	not	epistemologically	innocent)	factors.
Thus,	the	goal	of	science	is	partially	but	significantly	socially	related.	Why	is	
this	a	problem	for	Boyd’s	argument?	Because	it	suggests	replacing	his	picture	
about	the	scientific	dialectical	process	with	the	following	one:	we	have	a	so-
cial-historical	context	which	partially	determines	the	aim	of	science,	which	in	
turn,	together	with	the	available	background	knowledge,	stand	behind	a	meth-
odology	that	is	responsible	for	empirically	and	aim-adequate	theoretical	re-
sults	(see	fig.	2).	Progress	towards	truth	is	out	of	the	question	here	because	the	
methodology	is	no	longer	trustworthy	in	this	respect.	This,	of	course,	leaves	
us	with	the	problem	of	explaining	the	instrumental	reliability	of	this	method-
ology.	But	this	shouldn’t	bother	us	too	much	and	this	for	two	reasons.	First,	
there	are	alternative	anti-realist	explanations	to	choose	from.	Second,	if	we	
are	right	about	these	methods	and	the	scientific	decision	making,	a	truth-in-
volving	realist	explanation	(a	la	Boyd)	will	not	do	anyway	(it	would	be	crazy	
to	say	that,	even	though	socially	contaminated	as	they	are,	these	methods	can	
still	contribute	to	“the	overall	reliability	of	the	scientific	practice	with	respect	
to	the	acceptance	of	theoretical	principles	and	laws	which	are	not	only	predic-
tively	reliable	but	approximately	true	as	well”	(Boyd	1980,	p.	621)).
Fig.	2
2.4. Social constructivism… again
After	our	long	detour	has	ended,	we	can	return	to	our	previous	aim-related	
position	formulation	game.	What	would	be	a	proper	thesis	in	this	context?	I	
think	we	should	go	with	the	following	one:
C. K.:	Science aims at market competitive and social relevant knowledge 
of the world, and acceptance of its theories involves the belief that they 
are good [in terms of satisfying the aim].
As	 it	 stands,	 this	 thesis	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 satisfactory.	We	 don’t	 want	 to	
(wrongly)	imply	that	social	constructivism	(in	the	clothes	it	wears	here)	is	a	
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view	suggested	and	supported	only	by	this	recent	phenomenon	(the	capitali-
zation	of	knowledge).	What	I	have	in	mind	is	that	the	type	of	social	influence	
on	science	that	this	phenomenon	exhibits	accompanied	science	throughout	its	
history.	In	Steven	Shapin’s	words:
“Throughout	history,	 all	 sorts	of	universities	have	 ‘served	 society’	 in	 all	 sorts	of	ways,	 and,	
while	market	opportunities	are	relatively	novel,	they	do	not	compromise	academic	freedom	in	a	
way	that	is	qualitatively	distinct	from	the	religious	and	political	obligations	that	the	ivory	tower	
universities	of	the	past	owed	to	the	powers	in	their	societies.”	(Shapin	2003,	p.	19)
The	above	thesis	is	only	a	related	to	the	present	social	and	scientific	contexts	
expression	of	our	view.	A	complete	picture	will	consist	in	a	list	with	all	such	
theses	 that	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	 the	 history	 of	 science	 by	 replacing	what	
comes	after	“aims	at”	in	C.K.	above.	We	can	resume	this	list	with	the	help	
of	the	following	thesis	which	can	be	taken	as	the	essential	formulation	of	our	
position:
S.C.: Science aims at some socio-cultural contextual knowledge involving
aim, and acceptance of its theories can’t[shouldn’t] imply more than the
belief that they are adequate for [in light of] the contextualized aim.
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Gabriel Tȃrziu
Socijalni konstruktivizam i metodologija znanosti
Sažetak
Znanstvena praksa tip je društvene prakse i svako područje znanje uopćeno manifestira važnu 
društvenu dimenziju. No treba li se činjenica da znanstvena praksa nastaje suradničkim trudom 
članova društvene grupe biti povezati s proizvodima takve prakse? U ovom radu nastojim na to 
pitanje odgovoriti afirmativno. Moja će strategija biti argumentirati da cilj znanosti djelomično 
određen društveno-povijesnim uvjetima i da taj cilj, uključujući dostupno pozadinsko znanje, 
stoji iza metodologije odgovorne za empirijski adekvatne na cilj orijentirane teorijske rezul-
tate.
Ključne riječi
društveni	konstruktivizam,	cilj	znanosti,	znanstveni	realizam,	komercijalizacija	istraživanja,	znanstve-
na	metodologija
Gabriel Tȃrziu
Sozialer Konstruktivismus und Methodologie der Wissenschaft
Zusammenfassung
Wissenschaftliche Praxis ist eine Art sozialer Praxis, und jedes Wissensgebiet manifestiert ver-
allgemeinert eine wichtige gesellschaftliche Dimension. Soll jedoch die Tatsache, dass die wis-
senschaftliche Praxis durch mitarbeiterisches Bemühen der Mitglieder einer gesellschaftlichen 
Gruppe entsteht, mit den Produkten einer solchen Praxis in Verbindung stehen? In dieser Arbeit 
bin ich bestrebt, diese Frage affirmativ zu beantworten. Meine Strategie ist das Argument, dass 
das Ziel der Wissenschaft partiell von gesellschaftlich-historischen Bedingungen bestimmt wird, 
und dass dieses Ziel, einschließlich des verfügbaren Hintergrundwissens, hinter der Methodolo-
gie steht, die für empirisch adäquate zielorientierte theoretische Ergebnisse verantwortlich ist.
Schlüsselwörter
gesellschaftlicher	Konstruktivismus,	Ziel	der	Wissenschaft,	wissenschaftlicher	Realismus,	Kommer-
zialisierung	der	Forschung,	wissenschaftliche	Methodologie
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Gabriel Tȃrziu
Constructivisme sociale et méthodologie de la science
Résumé
La pratique scientifique est un genre de pratique sociale, chaque domaine de la connaissance 
manifestant de manière générale une importante dimension sociale. Au vue du fait que la prati-
que scientifique apparaît sur la base d’un commun effort des membres du groupe social, faut-il 
pour autant l’associer avec les productions de telles pratiques ? Dans ce travail, je m’attache à 
répondre à cette question par l’affirmative. Ma stratégie s’appuie sur l’argument selon lequel 
le but de la science, étant partiellement déterminé par des conditions historico-sociales, inclut 
un savoir accessible en arrière-plan, et est motivé par une méthodologie qui est responsable des 
résultats empiriques adéquats et de la théorie qui en résulte.
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